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I. INTRODUCTION
In Cleveland Board ofEducation v. Loudermill,t the United States
Supreme Court sought to put to rest a troublesome issue in its due
process jurisprudence. Loudermill was a security guard for the Cleve-
land Board of Education. He was fired from his job because he lied
on his job application. Although previously convicted of grand larceny,
Loudermill stated on his application that he had never been convicted
of a felony. The Cleveland Board of Education subsequently gave
Loudermill an opportunity to explain his conduct in an appeal before
the Cleveland Civil Service Commission. The Commission upheld the
dismissal.
Although the Civil Service Commission's decision was appealable
to the state courts, Loudermill brought a direct action in Ohio's Federal
District Court claiming that the state's post-termination appeal was
inadequate to protect his due process rights. The district court dismiss-
ed Loudermill's due process demand for a pre-termination hearing.
The court looked to the terms of Loudermill's asserted property right,
his statutory right not to be discharged without "cause," and concluded
that the appropriate procedures for discharge were specified in the
statute itself. These procedures were followed in Loudermill's case,
the district court reasoned, and by definition, afforded him all the
process that was due to protect his rights.
The district court relied explicitly on the Supreme Court's plurality
opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy.2 The plurality in Arnett reasoned that
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1. 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
2. 416 U.S. 134 (1973).
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where legislation conferring a substantive right also sets out the pro-
cedures for enforcing that right, the two cannot be separated:
The employee's statutorily defined right is not a guaran-
tee against removal without cause in the abstract, but such
a guarantee as enforced by the procedures which Congress
has designated for the determination of cause.
[W]here the grant of a substantive right iE: inextricably
intertwined with limitations on the procedures which are to
be employed in determining that right, a litigant in the po-
sition of appellee must take the bitter with the sweet.3
Although a majOlity of the Court rejected this language in Arnett
and elsewhere, the bitter-sweet theory of procedural rights has had
a continuing attraction for a number of justices since the Arnett
decision. Reacting to perceived confusion in the lower courts, the
Loudermill majority saw the case as a vehicle for making its rejection
of the bitter-sweet approach crystal clear. As the Court put it, "If a
clearer holding is needed, we provide it today."4 The Court held that
Loudermill's substantive right to discharge only for cause must be
separated from his procedural rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
The Court believed that its prior jurisprudence required that Louder-
mill have some opportunity to contest his discharge prior to being
terminated. It therefore held the Ohio procedures, which allowed only
a post-discharge appeal, to be unconstitutional.
Although Loudermill purports to clear up a problem in the juris-
prudence that has long excited commentators, I believe the opinion
is wrong in its analytical approach and that the decision reaches the
wrong result. '{'he Court's approach to the determination of the requi-
site "interest" that excites due process concern is incoherent, offensive,
and functionally inadequate. Results such as Loudermill both trivialize
concerns that lie at the base of due process protections and unreason-
ably interfere with judgments about the appropriate balance of pro-
cedural and substantive rights made by local, state, and federal gov-
ernments. Both methodology and results would be improved by replac-
ing the Court's current analytic paradigm with a natural rights ap-
proach. Such a model defines due process protections in terms of those
liberal democratic values that form a fundamental core of liberal demo-
cratic citizenship as evidenced by American constitutional history.
3. Id. at 152-54.
4. 105 S. Ct. at 1493.
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Because these general arguments have been made at length in Due
Process in the Administrative State,5 they will not be restated here
in any detail. Instead, this article will elaborate both its methodological
and outcome complaints in the Loudermill context. The argument is
in two parts: (1) the Loudermill treatment seriously misdirects due
process analysis; and (2) the implications of a properly conceived "nat-
ural rights" approach are no more, perhaps less, interventionist than
the apparently restrained positivism of Loudermill.
II. THE MISDIRECTIONS OF POSITIVISM
The Loudermill majority restates the general principle of Board
ofRegents v. Roth:6 "Propery interests are not created by the Constitu-
tion, 'they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state law ....' "7 The Court then finds the procedural dimensions
of the light to discharge only for cause under the Ohio statute are
defined, not by state law, but by the Court's view of the requirements
of constitutional due process.8
It is hard not to agree with Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, when
he says the Court has taken back with one hand what it gave "vith
the other. In his words,
This practice ignores our duty under Roth to rely on state
law as the source of property interests for purposes of apply-
ing the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
While it does not impose a federal definition of property,
the court departs from the full breadth of the holding in
Roth by its selective choice from among the sentences the
Ohio legislature chooses to use in establishing and qualifying
a right. 9
In short, the Court reads statutes as if they established rights that
have some independent meaning apart from the legal protections that
attend their deprivation. This would make sense only if those "rights"
obtained, by their very statement, a constitutional status independent
of their definition under state law. However, that is precisely what
5. J. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985).
6. 408 U.S. 564 (1971).
7. Loudennill, 105 S. Ct. at 1491 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1971».
8. 105 S. Ct. at 1493.
9. Id. at 1503 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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the Court denies. This position is incoherent and ultimately unwork-
able.
Suppose, for example, the Ohio statute provided Loudermill's
"right" in the following "procedural" form: "A discharged civil service
employee has a right to appeal his or her dismissal and to reinstatement
upon demonstration that the discharge was effected without cause."
Here the "right" itself is stated in wholly procedural terms. But its
contours are the same as those existing under the statute at issue in
Loudermill. IO What should a court do with such a statute? Should the
court "interpret" it to provide, first, a "substantive right" to discharge
only for cause with, second, appeal as a procedural protection for that
right? If the court does not, then presumably it must find that there
is no substantive right separate from the procedure and hence, no
due process right to additional procedure. The employee's rights, thus,
will depend on the form of the state statute. If the court does interpret
the statute in this bifurcated form, however, will that interpretation
be consistent with the creation of rights by state law, rather than by
federal constitutional law? The answer to this question must certainly
be "no."
If it can be assumed, therefore, that the Court means what it says
in Loudermill, when reaffirming Roth,l1 the maintenance of state dis-
cretion to define positive law rights becomes a mere formality. It is
a function of the way state statutes are drafted. Recognizing this,
Loudermill will ultimately lend no more assistance to lower courts
than has the Court's prior jurisprudence. Formal distinctions are
notoriously unstable. As lower courts struggle with meaningless dis-
tinctions between procedure and substance, form and result, they
inevitably will produce a perplexing and inconsistent jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court's attempt at clarity in Loudermill is doomed to
failure, if by clarity it sought to produce coherence.
The problems with the Loudermill-Roth position are deeper yet.
This positivist approach to defining interests cognizable under the due
process clause produces bizarre constitutional valuations of claims. A
prisoner's hobby kit, for example, is "property," raising due process
concern,I2 while a patient's removal from a nursing home, with its
risks of physical and mental decline, does not rise to the level of
constitutional notice. I3 Having one's picture circulated to local mer-
10. See id. at 1491 n.4, 1492 n.6.
11. See id.
12. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
13. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980).
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chants as an active shoplifter by the police department infringes no
property or liberty interest,14 but failure to inform a ratepayer of the
municipal utility company's procedures for pre-termination review of
disputed bills invades the ratepayer's property interests.15 It is a
strange constitution that protects hobby kits and rights to dispute
one's water bill, while leaving entirely to legislative or executive dis-
cretion the procedures for removal of nursing home residents from
their chosen facility or for the protection of one's reputation from
governmental encroachment, indeed from virtual assignment to a class
of "outlaws."
Finally, this focus on positive law triggers for due process concern
leads to more than jurisprudential incoherence and bizarre assignments
of constitutional value to citizens' interests. Such an approach is func-
tionally inadequate to address the problems of governmental or
bureaucratic discretion that the due process clause was meant to ad-
dress. The positive law trigger approach gives legal protection, or at
least due process attention, where some legal protection already exists,
while excluding due process concern where a legal regime seems to
permit official arbitrariness. Although many have a taste for irony,
few would choose Kafka or Ionesco as constitutional draftsmen.
Consider, for example, the situation in Holmes v. New York Hous-
ing Authonty.16 There, a public housing agency had no established
standards for processing non-preference applications for public hous-
ing. 17 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on Hornsby v.
Allen,18 held that this violated due process. 19 In Hornsby, a local liquor
commission was ordered to grant all applications for liquor licenses
until it established standards on which to base denial.20 Both Holmes
and Hornsby are widely cited for the proposition that unconstrained
administrative discretion violates due process. Both cases seem cor-
rectly decided. Protection against Kafkaesque, unlimited discretion of
officials is the underlying goal of the due process clause.
Despite their widespread citation, Holmes and Hornsby are virtu-
ally moribund authorities. A few liquor licensing decisions in the Fifth
14. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
15. Memphis Light, Gas & Water v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
16. 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
17. ld. at 264.
18. 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
19. Holmes, 398 F.2d at 264-65.
20. 326 F.2d at 612.
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Circuit have followed Hornsby/l and Holmes has found application in
a small number of cases dealing with other forms of welfare benefits. 22
The reason for the limited effect of these cases is easily discernable.
Where no standards exist for the exercise of administrative discretion,
even broad and loose ones such as the "cause" standard in Louder-
mill,23 positive law grants no substantive ''rights.'' If there is no right,
there is no life, liberty, or property interest that would trigger the
due process clause. The Supreme Court, indeed, has made this position
clear. In Leis v. Flynt24 the Court reversed a lower court decision
ordering the promulgation of standards, because the need for standards
indicated a lack of entitlement.25 In short, the Court's entitlement
analysis, grounded in positive law prescriptions, causes due process
protection to drop out of the Constitution when needed most. Discre-
tion bounded by standards requires due process; but absolute discre-
tion - discretion carrying the greatest danger of political oppression
- escapes constitutional notice under the current analysis.
Independently considered, these three objections to the positive
law trigger requirement are serious. Collectively, they make an over-
whelming case for abandonment. An analysis that is incoherent, that
assaults generally held intuitions about the worth or significance of
particular human interests, and that renders the constitutional require-
ment for due 'process of law impotent where official power is most in
need of procedural monitoring, has little to recommend it, except,
perhaps, the available alternatives. Indeed, the Court may cling to
positive law triggers only because they provide some anchor for due
process adjudication that otherwise will be adrift in a stormy sea of
"natural" or "fundamental" rights claims with no navigational aids
beyond the imagination of the justices.
This judicial anxiety is hardly frivolous. Judicial enunciation of
fundamental rights is not favored by commentators or the body politic.
If positivist analysis is to be eschewed, the "natural rights" alternative
must carry on our particular constitutional history and contain princi-
ples of self-limitation that guide and protect judicial review.
21. See Block v. Thompson, 422 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1973); Atlanta Bowling Center v. Allen,
389 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1968); Johnson v. Brown, 584 F. Supp. 510 (M.D. Ga. 1984).
22. See, e.g., Carey v. Quem, 588 F.2d 230, 232 (7th Cir. 1978).
23. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
24. 439 U.S. 438 (1979).
25. [d. at 442-46.
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III. DIGNITARY PROCESS: A CONSTRAINED,
NATURAL RIGHTS APPROACH
Suppose the positive law trigger were abandoned for due process
protections. What would take its place? Would any interest asserted
in litigation be worthy of due process concern? And, ifnot any interest,
then which? How will the Court decide among the concerns of citizens
and litigants to affirm those concerns entitled to constitutional due
process?
These questions, however, do not require answers. Rather than a
constitutional theory of individual interests worthy of due process
protection, what is needed most is a constitutional theory defining
what it means politically to be an individual, or to act as an individual.
The protection of the due process clause is the protection of individual
liberty - a condition of liberal citizenship in which the significance
of interests is individually determined. Courts, in applying the due
process clause, must delineate a conception of liberal-democratic
citizenship that can be defended against contradictory forms of law.
"Life, liberty and property" merely exhaust the range of interests
that might be held by citizens within the protections of such a concep-
tion of due process.
To be sure, finessing the "requisite interest" issue raises additional
concerns. Do these individuals who define their own interests also get
to design their own processes as a matter of constitutional right? Not
at all.
The natural rights approach set forth in this article proceeds from
three fundamental tenets. First, the due process clause, like the Bill
of Rights (if not the Constitution as a whole) was designed to protect
the political position of the individual. This is hardly controversial.
Second, and more problematically, protection of the individual involves
protection of the politically necessary conditions of continued individual
moral agency. This is the essential prerequisite for any liberal regime.
Third, our constitutional polity has a history that emphasizes the pos-
sibility of collective, democratic action as well as the necessity of
individual protection. The protection of particular individual interests
cannot always override collective choice. Rather, developing, pursuing,
and maintaining individual interests must be preserved through, as
well as in defiance of, collective action.
From these considerations, three essential elements of due process
in a liberal democratic regime can be derived. First, the law must
maintain zones of privacy. Individual and communal action cannot be
conceived of as action in the interest of, and at the sufferance of,
the state. Second, the law must be reasonably transparent and com-
prehensible to its subjects. Absent transparency and comprehensibil-
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ity, which can be termed "thin rationality," the possibilities for rational
planning and independent moral agency vanish. Third, the exercise of
democratic decisionmaking must affirm, through majority rule, the
equality of citizens as political agents.
Stated in this stark and abstract form, these ideas are not very
meaningful. But they should be sufficient to demonstrate the radical
dllIerence between the natural rights approach advanced here and
that now dominating constitutional jurisprudence. From this dignitary
perspective the question in a case like Loudermill26 is not whether
the state of Ohio has defined a positive law right such that Loudermill
has a constitutional interest. Rather, the question is whether the
statutory-administrative scheme is structured so that it infringes upon
a conception of Loudermill as a citizen ofa liberal democratic regime.
Does the Ohio scheme confuse public and private spheres?27 Does
it treat Loudermill as a mere object, as a means toward collective
ends without respect for his independent moral agency, or for his
equality as a participant in collective democratic processes? On all
counts, the answer is "no." To see why, and whether this analysis
has justificatory appeal, the privacy, moral agency, and citizen equality
issues must be viewed separately. The Loudermill facts must also be
compared with situations that might arouse greater due process con-
cern.
First, there is little or no impact here on Loudermill's opportunities
for continued private action.28 The public employee's due process
scheme, to the extent that it is relevant to issues raised in Loudermill,
evidences no attempt to make Loudermill's status as a public employee
synonymous with his status as a citizen.29 There are requirements and
responsibilities for the retention of Loudermill's job, but outside of
those, Loudermill may act in private capacities, like any other citizen,
without calling his continued employment into question.30
Compare Loudermill's case to the extraordinary impositions on the
private sphere that attend classification of a person as mentally incom-
petent or criminal. In these cases the Court should be most vigilant
to protect the citizen's remaining shreds of privacy and the possibilities
for restoration of full private citizenship. In these cases, the citizen
becomes subject to total institutions carrying out the collective will
of the state, even if ostensibly for beneficent purposes.
26. See 105 S. Ct. at 1487.
27. See supra note 10 and accompanying tm..1;.
28. See 105 S. Ct. at 1487.
29. See id. at 1488-91.
30. See id.
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A focus on privacy also teaches that other major changes in status
should remain voluntary rather than state-directed. This is the liberal
core of Roe v. Wad&l and Stanley v. Illinois. 32 Similarly, courts should
be wary of state power to criminalize without criminal process, or to
impose legal disability without trial. This is the core of the concern
characterized as "stigma" in cases like Hannah v. Larche,33 Jenkins
v. McKeithen,34 Wisconsin v. Constantineau,3S and Paul v. Davis.36
State power to punish, ostracize, or disable is always a serious threat
to individual liberty. Were the state the exclusive or principal em-
ployer in the United States, conditions on job access - even modest
ones like truth-telling on application forms - might excite serious due
process attention in order to maintain strict divisions between employ-
ment status and citizenship. But that is not Loudermill's case.37
Moreover, the "for cause" requirement in the Ohio removal statute38
supports the second fundamental requirement for due process - that
legal regimes be comprehensible to their subjects. The statement that
the employee has a right to remain in the job unless removed for
"cause" obviously is not understandable in the abstract. However, the
combination of this standard with rules and regulations governing
public employment, including, as in the Loudermill case, a requirement
of honest disclosure on application forms,39 hardly creates a Kafkaesque
legal system. To be sure, a court should be concerned that a broad
and loose "for cause" standard has some stable meaning within the
entire administrative system. Inconsistency or incoherence that pre-
vented individual self-application of the rules, or a cogent defense to
charges of impropriety, would suggest a denial of due process. But
the system at issue in Loudermill is hardly the system at issue in
Holmes or Hornsby.40 Neither the criteria for judgment nor the pro-
cesses of application are mysterious here. The system confirms Louder-
mill's status as an independent moral agent, entitled to reasons from
his employer and capable of understanding and acting on relevant
information.
31. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
32. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
83. 863 U.S. 420 (1960).
34. 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
85. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
36. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
37. 105 S. Ct. at 1488.
38. See supra note 10 and accompanying te:ll..t.
89. See 105 S. Ct. at 1491 n.4.
40. See supra notes 30 & 32 and accompanying text.
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This demand for comprehensibility is not a demand for "strong
democracy." Loudermill himself need not understand the rules fully
or have participated in their formulation. Comprehensibility does not
deny the possibility for bureaucratic regimes of considerable complex-
ity. The technicalities and interrelations of the Internal Revenue Code
may be difticult to understand,41 and the Internal Revenue Service
has some advantage in disputes about its meaning. But, looked at
comprehensively, the Internal Revenue Service collection system42 pro-
vides many places to stand and defend based upon the law. Champions
can fight back, even if the Code causes occasional befuddlement.
Finally, there is no significant impairment of Loudermill's partici-
pation in democratic collective action at issue in Loudermill.43 To be
sure, further procedural protections would give him greater leverage
in resisting whatever political blandishments might come from his
superiors. But the "for cause" limitation44 itself establishes a civil
service regime that is sufficient to defeat any attempt to mold indi-
vidual political participation by withholding public employment. In-
deed, the Supreme Court's own jurisprudence eliminating the spoils
system as a part of due process virtually makes the "for cause" stan-
dard necessary. It was in a prior decision, Elrod v. Burns,45 that the
Court protected the requirements of citizen equality that are at the
base of the demand for due process of law. There is no evidence that
the Court need go further in Loudermill to assure that democratic
equality is maintained.
Pursuit of the basic "natural rights" criteria of due process with
reference to the Loudermill facts gives texture to the second objection
to the Supreme Court's current due process approach. That approach
is not only under-protective of interests not well defined in positive
law, it seems over-protective of rights that are so defined. The funda-
mental conditions that define a political psychology of liberal democra-
tic citizenship - privacy, legal intelligibility, and political equality-
are not impaired by the Ohio system for removing public employees.46
Thus, the Supreme Court should not impose upon the City of Cleveland
further procedures for the treatment of cases like Loudermill's. While
the Court is usually criticized because of its entitlements analysis from
41. I.R.C. §§ 1-9602 (1986).
42. I.R.C. §§ 6301-6365 (1986).
43. 105 S. Ct. at 1487.
44. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
45. 427 U.S. 347 (1975).
46. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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those who perceive a need for more expansive protections under the
due process clause, the concerns presented here are at least equally
troublesome as inappropriate judicial activism. It is doubtful that an
"entitlement" will be found to be associated with a real threat to
liberal democratic citizenship on more than a chance basis. Properly
conceived, a natural rights theory of constitutional due process, there-
fore, should promote judicial restraint at least as often as it provides
necessary protections for individual interests.
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